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The range of interlocal contractual arrangements in the realm of public safety in 
Florida provides a research opportunity to examine the extent by which these 
arrangements have been used by local governments. We developed a contractual 
perspective on interlocal contractual arrangements as relational contracts by arguing that 
their institutional designs are partly an effort of the involved parties to reduce transaction 
costs that are the product of the properties of the services themselves; and partly by state 
statutes that allowed mixed approaches to contractual arrangements. A relational contract 
is advantageous because it specifies the activities to be rendered without unnecessarily 
intruding on the authority of the other jurisdiction. It is nonobligatory, voluntary, and 
easily terminated without legal consequences to either party. Alternatively, municipal and 
county governments can choose a more legally binding contract in the presence of 
regional politics and avoid future disputes by using non-relational contracts such as 
interlocal agreements, contracts or leases.  
 
Utilizing the data compiled by the Florida Department of Community Affairs 
from various Interlocal Service Delivery Reports prepared by 33 county governments 
with greater than 100,000 population, we identified 2,251 different types of contractual 
arrangements in the provision of public safety. Our results show that there is a positive 
and significant association between city-county relations and the type of contractual 
arrangement chosen to govern contractual relations. There is also evidence to suggest that 
when a specialized investment is required in the provision of public safety services, a 
non-relational contract will be preferred; and when measuring and monitoring the 
outcomes of the services are relatively difficult, a relational contract will be preferred. 
Homogeneity of a single functional service area represents similar policy preferences 
affecting the transaction costs of negotiating, operating, and enforcing contractua l 
arrangements; so did the number of collaborators involved in an agreement.  
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Municipal and county governments coordinate their activities in the provision of 
services of mutual concern through a variety of approaches: from interlocal service 
agreements to contract and lease agreements, from memoranda of understanding to 
mutual aid agreements, to informal “gentlemen's handshake” and letters of agreement. 
The different contractual arrangements employed by local governments to coordinate 
their activities are “commonly accepted ways” to adjust their resources and capacities to 
their service responsibilities (ACIR 1985:1). We conceptualize the different forms of 
interlocal contractual arrangements as relational contract developed to structure a range 
of interlocal exchanges. They act as mechanisms to cope with various magnitudes of 
uncertainty because they (1) provide information about how actors are expected to act in 
a particular situation; (2) can be recognized by involved parties in the action arena as 
rules to conform to; and (3) structure strategic choices in such a way to produce equitable 
outcomes (Ostrom 1990; Knight 1992; Maser 1998; Heckathorn & Maser 1987). They 
promulgate a variety of standards of conduct targeted to produce collective benefits by 
stipulating action to be carried out by involved parties sometime in the future and lay out 
rewards and penalties for compliance or failure to comply. 
 
Interlocal contractual arrangements have received much attention recently 
because of increasing pressure on local governments to carry out their functional 
responsibilities at lower costs (ACIR 1985; Atkins 1997). The benefits of interlocal 
contractual arrangements, formal or informal, accrue when local governments can 
coordinate and share their resources such that any duplication of local services can be 
eliminated; negative externalities and locally unwanted land use can be effectively 
addressed through joint planning; economies of scale and efficiencies in standardized 
service provision are realized (Stein, 1990; Morgan & Hirlinger 1991); and the 
management of local growth can be effectively coordinated in order to improve the 
regional communities as a whole (Florida Intergovernmental Commission 2001). 
Interlocal contractual arrangements are particularly beneficial to localities facing fiscal 
constraints, especially in functional areas that involve large capital start-up and personnel 
expertise (Sonenblum, Kirlin & Ries 1977; Post 2002). 
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Interlocal contractual arrangements have also been characterized by a high level 
of interdependence amongst municipal and county governments, their specialized 
departments as well as their regional agencies (Thurmaier & Wood 2002). The 
agreements are encouraged by activities that span political and administrative boundaries, 
symbolizing the fragmented American urban system. Interlocal contractual arrangements 
were also encouraged by the motivation to collaborate and cooperate in order to develop 
common perspectives on region-wide policy concerns and norms of cooperation and trust. 
Through the informational and reputation effects of formal and informal interactions, 
interlocal contractual arrangements increased potential region-wide policy effectiveness 
at lower cost than a political approach such as annexation or city-county consolidation 
that requires statutory authorization and approval by the citizens (Feiock & Carr 2004).  
 
The substantive focus of this study is to determine factors explaining the local 
government choice of interlocal contractual arrangements in an increasingly important 
urban policy area: public safety, where activities often cut across political and 
administrative boundaries. Public safety activities involving police are important for 
maintaining law and order, to protect life and property through exchanging arrest 
information, emergency communication, and police patrolling; while activities involving 
fire departments are useful for fire suppression and prevention; and the Emergency 
Medical Services are important for first responses during life threatening situations. 
Public safety personnel and capital resources are under increasing stress due to a recent 
rise in unforeseen natural disasters such as hurricanes and threats of man-made disasters 
such as terrorist attacks. Consequently, they are in need of coordinated policies involving 
a wide range of actors from hospitals and shelters and administrative organizations to 
multiple local provisional units such as the city police and county sheriff departments, 
emergency medical services, and fire departments as well as state and federal agencies. 
Indeed, there have been a range of contractual arrangements used by these actors to form 
ties in the provision of public safety services. Encouraged in part by the state statutes, 
they provide one of the most common management tools used by local government in 
public safety (Sonenblum, Kirlin & Ries 1977; Morgan & Hirlinger 1991) and provide 
the milieu in which we study the institutional choices local governments make in the 
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provision of public goods.  
 
The range of interlocal contractual arrangements in the realm of public safety in 
Florida provides a research site to examine the extent to which these arrangements have 
been used by local governments. This was conducted by examining the number of 
collaborators, and composition of a contractual arrangement, and whether the 
characteristics of goods and services determine the type of arrangements municipal and 
county governments will enter in the provision of the services. Our concern is also on 
state enabling statutes that encouraged cross jurisdictional activities that spanned 
administrative and political boundary. Different types of interlocal contractual 
arrangements were used to govern activities in order to reduce transaction costs of 
contracting. In the next section, this study develops a contractual perspective on interlocal 
contractual arrangements as relational contracts by arguing that their institutional designs 
are partly an effort of involved parties to reduce transaction costs that are the product of 
the properties of the services themselves; and partly by state statutes that allowed mix 
approaches to contractual arrangements. 
  
TRANSACTION COSTS, INTERLOCAL CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS, 
AND THE PROBLEM OF UNDERSUPPLY 
 
The transaction costs economic approach posits that an organization’s decision to 
internalize the production and provision of goods and services or to engage in an 
economic exchange through the market depends upon the comparative advantages of 
institutional arrangements in reducing the costs of transaction (Williamson 1975). 
According to the approach, the criteria influencing an organization’s decision depend 
upon (1) the transaction-specific asset that lacks transferability for use in a given 
transaction to other uses, (2) the relative ease in which an organization can monitor and 
measure the vendors’ fulfillment of the specificity of the contract, and (3) the frequency 
of contracting after the first round of bargaining (Brown & Potoski 2003). The 
combination of these characteristics makes the transaction costs of identifying, 
monitoring, and enforcing contracts somewhat difficult. For example, in a transaction that 
involves a highly specific asset where the vendor’s behavior is difficult to monitor and 
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the contract is long term, there is a high possibility that the vendor will act 
opportunistically and exploit the contract. The organization locked into the transaction 
will also subject itself to a weak bargaining position for renegotiating the contract in the 
future. In order to avoid being at this disadvantage, the transaction costs perspective 
predicts that an organization will opt for the transaction cost advantages of internal 
production. 
 
Previous studies relying on the transaction cost approach in explaining local 
government’s contracting decision generally focused on two extreme continuums of 
institutional arrangements: hierarchy and market structure. That is, whether to buy the 
service from the market or to produce internally the production or provision of services. 
When transaction costs are high, local government will be motivated to produce the 
service internally; while transaction costs are low, local government are motivated to 
reduce production costs through complete contracting. Some evidence suggests that 
complete contracting can lead to cost efficiency and costs saving by lowing production 
costs (Miranda & Lerner 1995; Perry & Babitsky 1986).  
 
However, local governments are not limited to the basic choice between complete 
contracting and direct provision. Local government experiencing threats of shirking 
problem with the private sector can mitigate the problem by contracting with other 
governments or nonprofit organization with similar mission-goal (Wise 1990). Within the 
public sector itself, recent empirical work has shown that local governments used 
multiple types of contractual arrangements to coordinate their activities in the delivery of 
public goods and services (ACIR 1985; Atkins 1997; Savas 2000).  
 
This study emphasizes that interlocal contractual arrangements are essentially 
relational contracts used by local governments to manage interlocal relations within the 
public sector due to uncertainty. Following Heckathorn and Maser (1987) extension of 
the transaction costs approach, relational contracts are defined as “adaptive features to 
affect realignments caused by unanticipated disturbances” (Maser 1998:528). And that, 
rational actors attempt to minimize unanticipated circumstances by crafting different 
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types of arrangements that are necessary and sufficient to secure interlocal cooperative 
relationships.  
 
How does the framework explain the existence of multiple types of interlocal 
contractual arrangements? The theoretical argument runs like this: uncertainties impose 
costs on interlocal relationships when in the course of coordinating multiple activities to 
meet local demands they are affected by natural disasters or interjurisdictional strategic 
acts. Absent foresight, parties to any transactions cannot agree on a substantive response 
to uncertainty, so in order to minimize costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task 
completion across jurisdictions, interlocal contracts are crafted as a procedural safeguard 
to reduce uncertainty (Gillette 2001; Maser 1998; Heckathorn & Maser 1987). The 
existence of multiple types of interlocal contractual arrangements provides alternative 
mechanisms for managing uncertainty because the ability of municipal and county 
governments to cope with uncertainty differs given their available capital and human 
resource endowments. They strategically align the safeguard guaranteed to them by a 
particular contractual arrangement against uncertainty accordingly because alternative 
arrangements also impose different costs on their relationships. So, local governments 
enter into a contractual arrangement in a bounded rational fashion by selecting an 
arrangement to achieve task completion that simultaneously minimizes the transaction 
costs of contracting.  
 
  The Heckathorn and Maser’s framework would posit that some interlocal 
contractual arrangements promote stability and decisiveness of a transaction if the set of 
rules---what Ostrom (1990:51) calls the “working rules”---governing that transaction are 
specified clearly and the outcomes of the transactions are also predictable. The specific 
rules determining specific outcomes determine the stability and decisiveness of the 
contractual arrangement. Once such a contractual arrangement exists, localities involved 
in the transaction will clearly know how the established arrangement can resolve 
potential disputes and enforce outcomes in predictable ways. Each locality involved 
knows that others also know this arrangement and thus will ensure cooperative acts.  
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For example, interlocal service agreements oftentimes require strictly fulfilling 
the terms of an agreement. Such agreements may include some or all of the following 
elements that specified the rules: the nature of the assistance to be rendered; discretion by 
the parties as to when and to what extent assistance will be available; the agency or entity 
that shall bear any liability arising from acts undertaken under the agreement; the 
procedures for requesting and for authorizing assistance; the agency or entity that has 
supervisory responsibility; a time limit for the agreement; the amount of any 
compensation or reimbursement to the assisting agency or entity; and any terms and 
conditions necessary to make the agreement effective (FLCIR 2001). If parties to the 
agreement follow these specified rules, resources will be allocated more efficiently, 
interlocal conflict will be reduced, and the services will be sustained over time. 
 
However, there are tradeoffs to clearly defined sets of rules and outcomes. A 
clearly defined set of rules embedded in the contractual arrangement determines the 
effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism to cope with the problems of uncertain future 
and the risks of opportunism. Once an agreement is adopted, it becomes legally binding. 
The rules governing the transaction can only be changed with the agreement of all. 
Parties to the agreement can only act on the basis of the negotiated agreement, unable to 
respond to changed conditions, leading to suboptimal outcomes. Individual parties to the 
agreement will then have lost the freedom of unilateral action or local autonomy and 
control in meeting their community needs even though external circumstances or 
preferences might change in ways that render the standing agreement unacceptable to one 
party.  This situation is more acute when multiple localities are involved---referred by 
Friesema (1970) as multilateral agreement---where renegotiation would involve high 
transaction costs. The agreement now turns into the “joint-decision trap” (Scharpf 1988), 
where the party gaining the most from the established agreement can block any changes, 
or at least extract an exorbitant side payment unless the decision to change can be made 
by consensus 1.  
                                                 
1 Consensus is defined here as the interactions amongst involved localities in discussion for alternative 
rules until no one insists on opposing a proposed solution, yet having the possibility of a clearly defined set 
of rules in the presence of blatant obstruction (Coleman 1990; Scharpf 1998).  
 
 9 
Alternative sets of working rules exhibiting “adaptive features” forming 
contractual arrangements are necessary to accommodate unanticipated changes in future 
conditions. Such contractual arrangements can greatly reduce transaction costs of writing 
a contractual arrangement and monitoring credible commitment if the decisions to 
provide public goods and services are made based upon consensus. One advantage for 
having adaptive features in contractual arrangements under consensus lies in the norm of 
reciprocity based on the expectations that none will engage in a strategic act to free ride 
on the efforts of others. Such reasoning seems a far stretch on goods and services having 
the characteristics of common pool resources such as water resources, but within the 
realm of public safety, for example mutual aid agreements for emergency first responses, 
the expectation that a locality will render assistance during disasters is not unforeseeable. 
In this situation, viewing interlocal contractual arrangements as relational contracts 
implies an intensive process of socialization and the existence of established long term 
associations serves as an effective means of control. 
 
In other instances however, social control as a means to monitor parties to an 
agreement are in compliance with the set of rules are not sufficient. Insofar as most 
interlocal contractual arrangements are between two local jurisdictions, some are made 
up of multiple jurisdictions and their specialized departments together with state and 
federal agencies. Individual locality incentives to participate in multilateral agreements 
do not reflect the full benefits since an additional effort increases the information and 
reputation resources for all others in the region without any additional investment by the 
others. Although such multilateral arrangements encouraged by state and federal policies 
could reduce the transaction costs to forming regional wide planning, the implementation 
efforts are actually public goods that tend to aid the region as a whole more than they aid 
any individual localities. The decision-making process will be dominated by lack of 
individual incentive to contribute to the effort of the collective, and thus will lead to an 
underinvestment in region-wide efforts to resolve their mutual concerns, which according 
to Ostrom (1990) is the second order collective action problem of institutional 
undersupply. We next consider whether the re is a potential role for state statutes in 
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encouraging local governments to enter into interlocal contractual arrangements and thus 
resolve the second order collective action problem.   
 
FLORIDA’S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK  
In the state of Florida, the expansion of interlocal service agreements came with 
the passage of the “Interlocal Cooperation Act of 1969” (s. 163.01, Fla. Stat.). The Act 
provides a broad legal framework for local governments to work together (ACIR 1995). 
For example, the Act authorizes local government units to enter into interlocal service 
agreements either with the public or private sector. Florida’s Interlocal Cooperation Act 
reflects also a general law allowing a mix in the approaches adopted to deliver services, 
which has led to extensive use of interlocal service agreements by counties in Florida 
(Florida Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations 1991:85). The identified 
benefits of this Act to local governments are to reduce the risk from litigation, especially 
in areas relating to utility coordination, school concurrency, gas tax splitting, planning 
issues and annexations (FLCIR 2001). Motivated by fear of litigation and legal liability, 
most local governments protect themselves by confining interlocal service agreements to 
a specific entity when conducting continuous governmental functional responsibilities. 
Under Section 163.01(5) Fla. Stat., the Act provides specific terms and definitions under 
which interlocal agreements may be entered into, including but not limited to the purpose, 
duration, organiza tion, and manner by which contracted parties will provide financial 
support and disbursal of funds (FLCIR 2001).  
 
Interlocal service agreements are most important in two arenas: (1) when local 
government makes a permanent transfer of total responsibility for the provision of a 
service to another governmental unit such as functional consolidation (ACIR 1985; 
Atkins 1997; FLCIR 2001); and (2) when transactions involve some forms of exchange 
for payments, revenue sharing, or impact fees. The contractual arrangements for these 
transactions, as authorized by the Act, are legally binding. This is particularly important 
because, unless an interlocal agreement is very specific, the passage of time and the 
“changing of the guard” of local decision makers can erode and obscure the original basis 
of an interlocal agreement, potentially causing significant problems for those left to 
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interpret its original goals (FLCIR 2001).  
 
Another important state statute designed to offer intergovernmental relations a 
higher priority is Florida’s “1985 Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land 
Development Regulation Act,” amended in the 1990s (Growth Management Act). Under 
this Act, the “intergovernmental Coordination Element” is a mandatory element of a local 
government comprehensive plan, which ultimately created a state requirement for local 
governments to coordinate planning activities with school boards, regional agencies, and 
state government. According to Florida’s Legislative Committee on Intergovernmental 
Relations (2001), the Growth Management Act has “had a significant impact” on 
interlocal coordination in two ways: (1) it has increased the use of joint planning 
agreements, which are agreements local governments enter into in order to plan for an 
area prior to its becoming available for development such as in the provision of water and 
sewer services, mutually maintained traffic corridors, police and fire protections, or 
mitigation strategies; and (2) it has made it mandatory for municipal governments to 
enter into interlocal agreements for planning coordination purposes, especially service 
responsibilities that potentially enhance the role of county government.  
 
Joint planning agreements and interlocal service agreements formed by localities 
in compliance with the Growth Management Act can potentially benefit local 
governments in several ways. In a broader sense, such agreements provide valuable 
information about localities growth management activities because so much of local 
government’s activities are unobservable to most state agencies. By entering into 
interlocal agreements and reporting them in the Intergovernmental Coordination Element, 
they are akin to building local government's reputations: their values are in the visibility 
of local governmental actions to cooperate and interact with other jurisdictions, regional 
agencies, and state department. Aside from the advantages of economies of scale, 
elimination of duplicative local government services, and increased effectiveness of 
growth management, the interlocal agreements incentive lies in eligibility requirements 
for participation in state or federal programs where coordination with other governmental 
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entities is a prerequisite.  
 
The third most important state statute can be found in Part I, Chapter 23, Florida 
Statutes, the “Florida Mutual Aid Act,” which authorizes a law enforcement agencies and 
state law enforcement mutual aid plan providing for the coordination of law enforcement 
planning, operations, and mutual aid across jurisdictional lines. It is important to note that 
mutual aid agreements in Florida can be classified into three general categories (FLCIR 
2001): (1) Operational assistance agreements between law enforcement agencies or 
between one or more law enforcement agencies and school boards that employ safety 
officers for the rendering of assistance in a law enforcement emergency, (2) Voluntary 
agreements used by local law enforcement agencies in protecting lives and property in 
event of disaster or emergency, and (3) The combination of both types of agreements.  
 
Local governments enter into these types of contractual arrangements because the 
terms and conditions of such agreements are generally non-obligatory; participation in 
the agreements is also generally voluntary and reciprocal. The agreements are flexible 
and adaptive in their usage for sharing of capital outlay and personnel resources. 
Compared to interlocal service agreements that emphasizes the fulfilling terms of an 
agreement in the provision of continuous governmental functional responsib ilities, 
mutual aid agreements have generally been regarded as a way local governments can 
share resources during an emergency without fear of being locked in to a contractual trap. 
Furthermore, mutual aid or operational assistant agreements “are operative only when 
certain conditions come into existence and they remain in operation only so long as these 
conditions are present” (Bollens & Schmandt 1965:77).  
 
Local law enforcement agencies are motivated to craft mutual aid agreements or 
operational assistance agreements for three reasons: (1) when emergency conditions 
come into existence and, upon request, employees of a law enforcement agency rendering 
aid outside their jurisdiction pursuant to the written agreement would have “the same 
powers, duties, rights, privileges, and immunities as if the employee were performing 
duties inside the employee’s jurisdiction.” The agreement allows a law enforcement 
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agency to provide assistance beyond its political boundaries; (2) a local agency rendering 
aid outside its jurisdiction will also be able to request reimbursement of the actual costs 
of providing the mutual aid either from the requesting jurisdiction or the state or federal 
government; (3) the benefits of accumulation of resources, especially when the capacity 
for local emergency services to respond to a large-scale regional event is questionable. 
Mutual aid and operational assistance agreements focusing on developing redundancy in 
local emergency response resources and personnel can limit the need for, and reliance 
upon, geographically distanced assistance especially during the initial stages of an 
emergency; and (4) the benefits also flow from the adaptive features such as non-
mandatory requirements for assistance and the incentive of not holding them liable for 
anything that might happen in the process of trying to help especially in the event of 
emergency. In an area of mutual concern, services identified are highly specific in nature 
and yet the contractual arrangement does not require a complete assumption of authority 
by the other jurisdictions. 
 
As for the emergency medical services, in addition to written contracts and 
interlocal service agreements in the provision of ambulance services, an EMS provider 
can respond and render services under a written mutua l aid agreement at the request of a 
signatory to the agreement during a major emergency. Other state statutes also encourage 
interlocal cooperation such as Chapter 252, Fla. Stat., known as the State Emergency 
Management Act. This act also applies to the provision of fire rescue.    
 
State statutes can encourage municipal and county governments to enter into 
contractual arrangements and provide a foundation for further interlocal cooperation in 
the provision of services because they allow a mixed approach to cooperation, from 
clearly specified working rules governing interlocal transactions i.e., interlocal service 
agreements, to more adaptive and flexible arrangements such as mutual aid agreements. 
The different approaches define the scope, stringency of requirements, and the degree to 
which local governments can enforce their claim if signatories default, and thus 





For a better sense of interlocal contractual arrangements in the provision of public 
safety, consider a combined mutual aid/operational assistance agreement in coordinating 
multiple jurisdiction activities in an event involving emergency response to bomb threats, 
explosives, hazardous devices, and weapons of mass destruction in the Florida Big Bend 
region. Under the Big Bend Bomb Squad agreement authorized by Section 23.12, Fla. 
Stat., a front line task force was established in 2005 consisting of four law enforcement 
agencies in Leon County: the State of Florida Division of Fire Marshals, Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement (Division of Capitol Police), Leon County sheriff's 
office, and the city police of Tallahassee. The agreement promulgated standards of 
conducts targeted to produce public benefits through a redundancy in local emergency 
response resources and personnel because a local emergency service’s capacity to 
respond to a large scale event alone was questionable. As the producer of this service, the 
task force responsibility remains in Leon County at all times and may provide first line 
response to the other 12 counties in the Big Bend region only upon request.  
Take another example of contractual arrangement. In 2002, an Evidence Storage 
agreement was entered between Leon County's sheriff and the Florida Department of 
Transportation. A relatively straightforward agreement, the contractual arrangement 
involved two signatories and provided temporary access for the Florida Department of 
Transportation to store the department's property/evidence on a large shelf within the 
Sheriff's evidence storage vault. No financial transfer was involved in this agreement, but 
the obligations specified in the contract were unique only to this agreement such as the 
familiarization training regarding submission procedures and retrieval of evidence, 
packaging of evidence, identifier log, and firearms. The highly specified working rules 
gave protection to both parties in the event of any claims if any of the signatories should 
default. Contrary to the mutual aid agreement, the evidence storage agreement between 
two public organizations provided specific safeguards to both parties’ legal rights.  
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Identifying Interlocal Contractual Arrangements. In order to identify the 
different types of interlocal contractual arrangements, we utilized the data compiled by 
the Florida Department of Community Affairs (FDCA) from various Interlocal Service 
Delivery Reports. The FDCA required 33 county governments in Florida with greater 
than 100,000 population, their municipalities, and special districts to report interlocal 
service agreements by eight major types of community services or functional categories. 
Our substantive area focused on the different types of contractual arrangements in the 
provision of public safety, which includes police, fire, and emergency medical services.   
In identifying the different types of contractual arrangements, we tried to ensure 
that the agreements reported were in accordance with statutory definitions discussed 
earlier. Although most localities generally made implicit reporting on the types of 
agreements governing their transactions, others did not. To overcome this problem, we 
relied on titles of agreement to gain insight on the types of contractual arrangements. For 
example, the Big Bend Region Bomb Squad Mutual Aid and Operational Assistant 
agreement would fall under the mutual aid agreement classification; whereas the 
Evidence Storage agreement would fall under the interlocal agreement.  
We found the following types of interlocal contractual arrangements were 
commonly used by local governments in the provision of public safety: informal 
interlocal agreements based on mutual understandings or letter of agreement to assist 
other jurisdictions “upon verbal request”; Memorandum of Understanding, typically used 
to establish general guidelines for a specific locally coordinated activity; 
intergovernmental coordination agreement or interlocal agreement that establishes a 
formal agreement between governments on specific roles and responsibilities; mutual aid 
agreement and operational assistance agreement between jurisdictions on public safety 
services that cut across multiple political boundaries; and joint planning agreements 
which set standards or limitations on actions taken by local governments in the area prior 
to its development. Other types of contractual arrangements were also frequently used 
such as contracts or leases, permit agreements, local ordinance, and resolutions.   
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Identifying Public Goods and Services. With our list of interlocal contractual 
arrangements identified, we needed to distinguish the specific types of goods and services 
in the provision of public safety---which Savas called “component sub-services” 
(2000:71). There has been considerable progress being made by scholars in constructing 
types of goods and services in the public sector (Farris & Grady 1986; Post 2002; Stein 
1990; Brown & Potoski 2003). These studies suggested that local governments choose 
different types of contractual arrangements was based on their response to key 
characteristics of the services. From these empirical studies, a range of goods and 
services in the provision of public safety by local governments was provided (ACIR 1985; 
Sonenblum & Kirlin 1977; Farris & Graddy 1986; Brown & Potoski 2003). We reviewed 
them and then arranged the different service types from the previous studies and cross-
checked them against the description of the agreement reported in the Interlocal Service 
Delivery Reports (FDCA 2004). We identified fourteen specific types of services in the 
provision of public safety. The list is presented in Table 1 below. 
 
THE MODEL 
The logistic regression model is designed to explain whether boundary spanning 
as encouraged by state statutes, the characteristics of goods and services, functional 
service area, and the number of collaborators in the provision of public safety influence 
the types of interlocal contractual arrangement. The model takes into account the 
arguments put forward by Heckathorn and Maser on relational contracts, an extension of 
the transaction costs approach.      
 
The Dependent Variable 
To operationalize Heckathorn and Maser’s framework on relational contracts, we 
aggregated different types of interlocal contractual arrangements into two general 
classifications: “Relational Contract” and “Non-Relational Contract”. For example, the 
Big Bend Region Bomb Squad agreement with its nonobligatory and voluntary features 
would fall under the relational contract classification; whereas the Evidence Storage 
agreement with its strict requirements for fulfillment of the contract will fall under the 
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non-relational contract classification.  The dependent variable takes a value of 1 for an 
interlocal contractual arrangement having a relational contract; and 0 otherwise.   
 
These broad classifications were particularly important to our analysis because 
they determined the different working rules embedded in different types of interlocal 
contractual arrangement. They are essentially “rules about rules and about authority” 
(Lowi 1985:74). They structured actors’ behavior and can be changed by actors 
themselves, so they were also affected by the strategic choice actors made when crafting 
contracts, i.e., whether to have clearly defined working rules or flexible working rules 
governing a transaction. Moreover, we are most interested to determine not only the 
general pattern in which different levels of interlocal relations have affected contractual 
choice, but also the context in which the contractual arrangements were formed.  
 
Independent Variables 
 Boundary Spanning.  We used three types of interlocal relationships as proxies 
to determine statutory effects on interlocal contractual arrangements. The argument that 
state statutes enabled local governments to enter into contractual arrangement s 
encouraged political and administrative boundary spanning. In order to span these 
boundaries, municipal and county governments choose the types of interlocal contractual 
arrangement that could reduce the transaction costs in maintaining those relations. To 
illustrate this proposition, we focused on three types of political and administrative 
boundaries spanning: county-county, county-city, and city-city relations ; and seek to 
understand how these relations have affected the types of contractual arrangements local 
governments entered into.  
 
First, interlocal contractual arrangements explained by vertical boundary-
spanning involve municipal and county governments. Research on intergovernmental 
relations has long identified the importance of vertical integration in the area of planning 
for emergency and policing activities (Waugh 1994; Rubin & Barbee 1985), regional 
cooperation (Savitch & Vogel 1996), or city-county consolidation. Because county-city 
relations in Florida are often beset by conflicts over turf and annexation problems such as 
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streets bordering another city lie within an adjoining municipality, it may make sense to 
standardize planning effort uniformly throughout a patchwork of fragmented jurisdictions. 
But it is less sensible for any single jurisdiction unwilling to forgo control or autonomy. 
A positive and significant association between city-county relations and the type of 
contractual arrangement suggests a preference for a relational contract. A relational 
contract is advantageous because it specifies the activities to be rendered without 
unnecessarily intruding on the authority of the other jurisdiction. It is easily terminated 
without legal consequences to either party. Alternatively, municipal and county 
governments can choose a more legally binding contract in the presence of regional 
politics and avoid future disputes. A negative and significant association between city-
county relations and the type of contractual arrangement suggests a preference for a more 
legally binding contract with clearly stated working rules.  
 
Second, interlocal contractual arrangements explained by horizontal boundary-
spanning between municipalities. These arrangements will integrate local municipalities 
operating within or across county political boundaries. Local municipalities are most 
vulnerable to the incidence of urban crimes and often act as frontline responders to 
emergencies. However, conventional wisdom suggests that localities are highly 
competitive and face greater obstacles to dividing bargaining surplus from cooperative 
efforts. They share similar concerns, but their attempts to improve conditions are 
impeded by collective action problems. For example, competitive jurisdictions will act 
strategically to capture the greater share of the surplus (who should get the credit). 
Specifically, each is likely to use private information about costs incurred and benefits 
gained from any joint project to indicate why it requires certain concessions to make 
participation worthwhile. Hence, contractual arrangements between municipal 
governments are likely to be based on a clear set of working rules governing transactions 
in order to secure distributive surplus.  
 
Third, interlocal contractual arrangements explained by horizontal boundary-
spanning between county governments. These arrangements integrate the region as a 
whole when multiple counties working together can take advantage of redundancy in 
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local emergency response resources and personnel. The capacity for region-wide services 
improves responses to emergency and minimizes risk to local residents and businesses. 
Activities covering a large and multi-jurisdictional boundary require a contractual 
arrangement that has a broad impact and yet is adaptive to conditions or changes. So, we 
would anticipate a relational contract to be most likely in intergovernmental relations of 
county-county interactions.    
 
Characteristics of Goods and Services. Previous studies suggesting that local 
governments choose different types of contractual arrangements are based on their 
response to key characteristics of the services (Farris and Grady 1986; Post 2002; Stein 
1990; Brown and Potoski 2003). This section supplements the relational contract 
argument that municipal or county governments will choose contractual arrangements 
that can reduce the transaction costs of writing, monitoring, and enforcing of a contract. 
When the transaction costs are high in the provision of goods services, outcomes of the 
contract are difficult to quantify and local government will opt for a more adaptive type 
of contractua l arrangement. When the transaction costs are high in the provision of goods 
and services involving high asset-specificity, local government will opt for a clearer set 
of working rules governing the contractual arrangement. A non-relational contract will be 
crafted. Following Brown and Potoski’s (2003) extension of Williamson’s transaction 
costs approach, asset specificity is defined as the specialized investment required to 
produce the services i.e., whether specialized investments needed for the production of 
one service can also be used for the production of other services. Service measurability is 
defined as the relative difficulties in measuring and monitoring the outcomes of the 
services.  
 
As an operational necessity, we have aggregated the different types of public 
safety goods and services based upon Brown and Potoski’s general dimensions, but we 
must not forget that this is a constrained view, especially when goods and services may 
contain both dimensional properties. Thus, for example, the joint planning, mitigation 
strategies, and protocol services would also fall under a realm that is difficult to measure, 
but the key action required has also to do with the need to plan a detailed strategy to 
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mitigate a specific problem. The action required would be highly procedure specific and 
asset specific. When the outcomes of developing and planning for mitigation strategies, 
joint terrorism task forces, or a mutual aid operating plan are relatively difficult, a 
potential free rider problem is inevitable. In addition, because of the specialized 
investment required to meet the region-wide efforts, actors in the contractual arrangement 
may also subject themselves to opportunistic behavior by others in the agreement. For 
these reasons, a third category is presented to capture services that have high asset 
specificity and high service measurability.  
 
Functional Service Areas. This variable attempts to capture whether agreements 
within a particular traditionally functional service area such as law enforcement for police 
department, ambulance services for EMS, and fire prevention/suppression for fire 
departments---affects the type of contractual arrangements. A single functional service 
area represents homogeneity of policy goals and preferences. A single functional service 
area can reduce the transaction costs of negotiating an agreement, expending fewer 
resources, and encouraging the development of mutual trust among local governments. A 
contractual arrangement in the presence of homogeneity in a functional service area 
reduced transaction costs of negotiating, operating, and enforcing contracts, motivated 
local government to choose relational contracting.  
 
The traditional public safety functional roles are eroding, however. The provision 
of public safety can cut across multiple functional agencies’ responsibilities. Some 
localities combined EMS and fire department responsibilities such that some ambulance 
dispatch services and emergency helicopter services were carried out by the fire 
departments. Increasingly in Florida, interlocal agreements have been used in the 
provision of public safety involving multiple agencies. When a service cuts across 
multiple provisional units, parties to the agreement having additional responsibilities 
compromise their traditional functional roles; and anticipated high transaction costs of 
negotiating, operating, and enforcing will be observed in the provision of the contract. A 
non-relational contract would be used to avoid future disputes over operating and 
enforcing the provision of a service. High transaction costs in combined functional 
 21 
service areas, involving seemingly different functional agencies, would indicate a 
likelihood of non-relational contracting to mitigate future uncertainty.  
 
The effect of functional service areas is operationalized using dummy variables: a 
single functional service area includes the law enforcement category; fire category; EMS 
category; and the combination of any of these specialized functional areas.  
 
Number of Collaborators . The number of collaborators involved in a contractual 
arrangement is an important determinant of collective action. The number of 
collaborators entering into a contractual arrangement is directly related to Olson’s (1965) 
notion of group size: it dictates the relative distributional gains, monitoring and 
enforcement costs of others behavior. The smaller the group, the easier it is to form a 
contractual arrangement because there are fewer problems determining how benefits will 
be distributed, the monitoring cost will be lower and thus, less shirking problems. A large 
number of collaborators in a contractual arrangement make the relative benefits to 
individual collaborators decrease. The higher the number of collaborators, the greater the 
organization costs, and the easier it is to free ride from the efforts of others. The 
transaction costs are higher in large size collaboration.  
 
The number of collaborators determines the type of contractual arrangement when 
the anticipation to renegotiate a contractual arrangement involves high transaction costs, 
especially in multilateral agreements. Inability to renegotiate a term of a contract can turn 
into a joint-decision trap unless those mostly benefiting from the contract are willing to 
renegotiate and adjust to an unanticipated change of conditions. Under this situation, a 
relational contract will be preferred because the fulfillment of the arrangement is 
nonobligatory, reciprocal, and yet easily terminated without legal consequences. So, the 







Differences in Patterns of Interlocal Contractual Arrangements  
By Types of Goods and Services 
 
Before discussing the model estimation, it is important to examine several cross-
sectional differences in the types of contractual arrangements used for particular types of 
services. The non-relational contracts identified include interlocal agreement, contract or 
lease; and the relational contracts include mutual aid agreement, memorandum of 
understanding, and letter of agreement or informal agreement. The bottom column in 
Table 1 shows that the non relational contracts were mostly formed by interlocal 
agreements i.e., about 52% of the total interlocal contractual arrangements; whereas, 
relational contracts were mostly formed by mutual aid agreements and memorandums of 
understanding. When combined they constituted about 34% of the total interlocal 
contractual arrangements. At a glance, information in Table 1 suggests interlocal 
contractual arrangements in the provision of public safety were mostly conducted through 
non-relational contracts rather than relational contracts.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In terms of types of public safety services provided through a range of interlocal 
contractual arrangements, all services in the provision of public safety between local 
governments were conducted using interlocal service agreements. In the last column of 
Table 1, the types of services involved in interlocal contractual arrangements were mostly 
in mutual assistance-disaster relief (26%), followed by joint planning and mitigation 
strategies (12.3%), fire prevention/suppression (12%), and crime prevention and law 
enforcement (10.5%). Most emergency medical services and fire prevention/suppression 
were provided using interlocal service agreements; while most mutual assistance-disaster 
relief services involved mutual aid agreements.   
 
Although interlocal contractual arrangements can be argued to have been 
determined by state statutes such as mutual aid agreements authorized by the Mutual Aid 
Act and were generally used for emergency services, interlocal service agreements as 
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authorized by Intergovernmental Coordination Act of 1969 were for continuous service 
provision. This is not necessarily true across the board. The patterns illustrated in Table 1 
also suggest that interlocal agreements have been used for mutual aid-disaster relief; and 
mutual aid agreements have been used for crime prevention and law enforcement services. 
We come to the conclusion that state statutes have allowed mixed approaches to 
contractual arrangements across a wide range of services. 
 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics. The incidence of contractual 
arrangements among municipalities and the contractual arrangements among county 
governments were low compared to the incidence of contractual arrangements amongst 
municipal and county governments. The incidence of contractual arrangements in 
emergency medical services was also low compared to police, fire, and the combined 
functional service areas. The average number of collaborators was about 2.5 per 
agreement suggesting that most agreements were conducted between 2 jurisdictions. 
Diagnostics performed to detect multicollinearity above 0.8 suggests no serious problem; 
the independent variables were dependent to each other.     
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Interpreting Logit Coefficients 
 In Table 3, the overall Model 1 chi square is 645 and is statistically significant 
(df9, p<.01). The model correctly predicts about 74 percent of the cases and the 
Proportional Reduction in Error is about 32 percent. To interpret the effect of each 
independent variable, the results show that the coefficient operating on city-county 
vertical boundary spanning is negative and statistically significant at the .01 level. This 
indicates that if boundary spanning involved city-county relations, the probability that a 
relational contract was used in the provision of public safety decreases compared to other 
 24 
type of boundary spanning relations. Specifically, for a vertical boundary spanning 
involving city-county relations, the log odds ratio of having a relational contract is .68 
lesser than the other form of boundary spanning, holding all other variables constant. The 
effects of the other boundary spanning variables on relational contracts are anticipated 
though statistically not significant.   
 
The effects of characteristics of goods and services variables on relational 
contracts are both statistically significant. For example, when outcomes of services are 
relatively difficult to measure and the monitoring and enforcement costs are high, a 
relational contract was preferred to safeguard the arrangements. On the other hand, when 
the services have high asset specificity, a non-relational contract was preferred. The log 
odds ratio of a contractual arrangement involving asset specificity having a relational 
contract is .26 less than other types of goods and services, holding other variables 
constant.  
 
The effects of individual functional service area on relationa l contracts are 
statistically significant, but the type of contract used to govern transactions differs. For 
example, in a combined functional service area, where more than one specialized 
functional agency was involved in the provision of public safety, the contractual 
arrangement used was more likely to be a relational contract. The effect of law 
enforcement functional area on relational contracts was anticipated and statistically 
significant. The emergency medical services, on the other hand, generally employed non-
relational contracts. The directional effect of EMS on the type of contractual 
arrangements formed was unanticipated by the model and we discuss the reasons in the 
next section.  
 
Theoretically it is possible that the effects of functional service area on the type of 
contractual arrangement varied by the number of collaborators in an agreement. A 
contractua l arrangement involving combined functional service areas such as law 
enforcement, fire, and EMS must reflect the diverse policy preferences of those 
concerned. Negotiation involving a larger number of agencies with multiple functional 
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service areas would lead to a relational contract because a large number of parties with 
different preferences can potentially lead to disputes over policies and goals more likely 
than with a homogeneous functional service area. Moreover, a joint decision trap is 
highly probable. This proposition predicts a positive association between the interactive 
terms of a combined functional service area and the number of collaborators on the type 
of contractual arrangement.  
 
In Model 2, we introduced the interactive effects of the number of collaborators 
and functional service area on the type of contractual arrangement. A likelihood ratio test 
was used to determine whether the inclusion of the interactive terms contributed to the 
overall effect of the model. The inclusion of the interactive terms is statistically 
significant ( 2LRX  = 15.86, df = 3, p < .0012). The predicted probability in the model 
ranges from .033 to .996, with a mean predicted probability of having a relational 
contract of .611. In Model 2, the results show that the anticipated effect of combined 
functional service area on the type of contractual arrangement varying by the number of 
collaborators was correctly predicted but statistically it was not significant. A similar 
conclusion was reached on the effect of EMS and number of collaborator interactive 
terms.  
 
Theoretically, it is also possible that the effect of a single homogeneous functional 
service area on the type of contractual arrangement varies by the number of collaborators. 
The results in Model 2 suggest that the effect of law enforcement functional area on the 
type of contractual arrangement indeed varied by the number of collaborators. The effect 
is negative and statistically significant. We compared the differences between law 
enforcement and the other functional service areas to predict the type of contractual 
arrangement. Our calculation indicates that the probability of having a relational contract 
is less likely for law enforcement than the other functional service areas, when the 
interaction term was taken into account and holding the other variables at their mean. 
Specifically, the predicted probability was .264 less for law enforcement than the other 
functional service areas.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The decision to enter into a relational contract with another government is usually 
viewed as a technologically driven choice to reap the benefits of economies of scale 
(Ferris & Graddy 1986) and the characteristics of goods and services that are the product 
of transaction costs (Brown & Potoski 2003). For example, when there is difficulty of 
imposing jurisdictional boundaries or exclusion of other users such as cultural and 
recreational services, local governments are more likely to enter into an interlocal 
agreement (Stein, 1990). When outcomes of the services are difficult to monitor and the 
investment required is highly specific and lacks transferability, local governments are 
more likely to contract with each other rather than with the private sector (Brown and 
Potoski 2003). And, when a large service area is required to attain scale economics in 
capital- intensive investment and another local government is currently providing the 
service, other local governments are likely to enter into an arrangement with that 
government (Farris and Grady 1986, Post 2002).  
 
Although these studies have provided theoretical grounds to examine the local 
governments’ contractual choice in meeting local residents demand for services, they fall 
short of explaining the different types of existing interlocal contractual arrangements 
capable of coping with uncertainty. As shown in our analysis, the type of contractual 
arrangement chosen by parties in the provision of public safety depends on the 
characteristics of goods and services: outcomes that are difficult to measure generally 
relied on relational contracts because the service outcomes cut across interjurisdictional 
boundaries. On the other hand, compared to other characteristics of goods and services, 
services that have higher asset specificity tend to be governed by non-relational contracts.   
 
With whom have municipal and county governments usually joined in contractual 
arrangements? Typically, the type of interlocal contractual arrangement chosen when 
interjurisdictional relations were involved tends to be based on non-relational contracts. 
Previous studies have proposed that county government should take on a larger role in the 
provision of public safety for a region, arguing for the benefits of economies of scope and 
the accumulation of resources. Smaller and isolated municipalities may lack the incentive 
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to cooperate with each other in the provision of public safety, and thus the county should 
fill the role as central coordinator (Waugh 1994). The evidence suggests that when 
municipal and county governments entered a contractual arrangement with each other, 
the type of agreements employed generally involved non-relational contracts where strict 
and legally binding arrangements ensured safeguards in the transactions.      
 
Non-relational contracts are more suited for the provision of public safety within 
the context of vertical boundary spanning because municipal and county governments are 
highly dependent on each other. Municipalities might depend on county governments 
because they are politically and administrative ly closer to state and federal governments 
in terms of receiving state resources and technical assistance; more able to act as 
mediators to inter-municipality policy goals and policy preferences; and have a larger 
geographical base, greater ability to reap the benefits of economies of scope, and a 
broader perspective to respond to regional needs. However, municipal governments are 
also apprehensive of county government over intralocal inequality of service provision 
such as decisions about allocation of fire or police stations. In order to avoid uncertainty 
and opportunistic behavior, municipal and county governments entered into non-
relational contracts. Vertical boundary spanning, expanding political and administrative 
boundaries and relying on non-relational contracts, can produce a happy compromise 
based on stylized contracts that enumerate the obligations of each party.      
 
The effect of functional service area on the type of contractual arrangement is 
particularly important. Law enforcement agencies entering into an agreement with other 
law enforcement agencies and having similar policy and goal preferences generally 
preferred to have relational contracts because they shared similar concerns, interacted and 
trained under the philosophical approach of professionalism. This is not to say that law 
enforcement agencies were generally cooperative in the provision of public safety; the 
key to emphasize here is that when compared to other functional service areas, in the area 
of law enforcement, the contractual arrangement generally involved a relational contract. 
This is because the transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing interlocal contractual 
arrangements are relatively lower than non-relational contracts.  
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In the case of EMS, when compared to other functional service areas, there is a 
greater likelihood of a non-relational contract. One of many reasons for this is because 
EMS generates revenues to local government. For example, in east central Florida, it has 
been reported that EMS can generate revenue to the tune of $ 8 million to $ 10 million a 
year (The Ledger, March 17, 2005). The operation costs, on the other hand, are relatively 
high and the provision of EMS is labor intensive. So, to ensure parties to the agreement 
do not act opportunistically, a non-relational contract is employed. In Leon County, the 
EMS system has about 96 employees, including 58 full time and 20 part time paramedics 
and emergency medical teams operating 10 or more ambulances at peak hours. Given the 
investment involved and the controversy surrounding the provision of EMS in the county, 
an interlocal agreement with the city of Tallahassee is preferred to ensure that the legal 
terms of the contract are met, the intake mechanism is effective, and the problems of 
uncertainty due to opportunism minimized (Tallahassee Democrat, January 16, 2004).  
 
One of the surprise results is related to the provision of public safety that cut 
across multiple functional agencies’ responsibilities. Increasingly in Florida, interlocal 
agreements have been used in the provision of public safety involving multiple agencies. 
The theoretical model argues that when a service cuts across multiple provisional units, 
parties to the agreement having additional responsibilities compromise their traditional 
functional roles; and anticipated high transaction costs of negotiating, operating, and 
enforcing will be observed in the provision of the contract. Compared to other functional 
service areas, the results of the model show that the effect of combined functional service 
area on relational contract was likely. One explanation has to do with the motivation to 
avoid a contractual trap, especially when there is a need to accommodate multiple 
preferences.  
 
To conclude, we have examined the factors that explained the different types of 
contractual arrangements. We argued that they were the product of state statutes 
employed by local government to span their political and administrative boundaries. We 
have shown that vertical boundary spanning involving municipal and county 
 29 
governments generally employed non-relational contracts. We have also shown that the 
characteristics of goods and services as the product of transaction costs influenced the 
types of interlocal contractual arrangements in the provision of public safety. Functional 
service area and the number of collaborators involved also influence the type of interlocal 
contractual arrangements municipal and county governments employed.  
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Patterns of Interlocal Contractual Arrangements by Types of Goods and Services: Public Safety 
 
 Non Relational Contract  Relational Contract    
 


















Asset Specificity           
Equipment & Vehicle Maintenance  86 9  4 10 -  3 112 
Building Expansion & Shelters 125 30  6 5 2  19 187 
Police/Fire Communication 143 3  3 9 6  51 215 
Crime Lab & Investigation  34 2  9 15 -  1 61 
Crime Prevention &Law 
Enforcement  
159 8  73 8 2  15 265 
Billing & Financial Payment 160 13  8 3 -  7 191 
Prisons and Jails  8 3  - - -  1 12 
Licensing  6 2  - - -  - 8 
Technical Training Programs  50 1  2 5 -  10 68 
Service Measurability          
Emergency Medical Services 59 5  - 2 3  7 76 
Fire Prevention/Suppression 169 10  - 50 12  55 296 
Mutual Assistant – disaster relief 110 2  503 20 1  11 647 
          
Joint Planning & Mitigation 
Strategies 
168 5  83 26 -  27 309 
Technical Assistant & Joint Studies  14 -  1 1 -  5 21 





























Relational Contract .611 .488 0 1 
Boundary Spanning`     
     City-City relations .075 .263 0 1 
     City-County relations .435 .496 0 1 
     County-County relations .181 .385 0 1 
     Others interorganizational relations .293 .455 0 1 
Characteristics of Services     
     Service Measurability .420 .494 0 1 
     Asset Specificity .448 .497 0 1 
     Measurability and Asset Specificity  .132 .339 0 1 
Functional Service Areas     
     Combined  .299 .458 0 1 
     Police Services .375 .484 0 1 
     Emergency Medical Services .070 .255 0 1 
     Fire Services .256 .437 0 1 
No. of Collaborators  2.530 2.082 2 20 
 
No. of Observations = 2,251 





Logistic Regression Coefficients (and Standards Errors) Predicting 
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Interaction Effects   
      Combined Functional Area / No. of       
      Collaborators 
        _ .031 
(.081) 
      Police Services / No. of  
      Collaborators 
        _ -.145** 
(.064) 
      EMS / No. of Collaborators 
 
          _ .229 
(.173) 
 
No. of Observations               2,251        2,251 
LR Chi squared                       645.00***      660.85*** 
Pseudo R-squared                    .21 .22 
Log Likelihood                  -1185.37     -1177.44 
% Correctly Predicted            73.67          73.80 
Proportional Reduction in Error                                 32.40%        32.82% 
Note: Level of significant: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10  
 
